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Neuroeconomics applies models from economics and psychology to inform neurobiological studies of
choice. This approach has revealed neural signatures of concepts like value, risk, and ambiguity, which
are known to influence decisionmaking. Such observations have led theorists to hypothesize a single, unified
decision process that mediates choice behavior via a common neural currency for outcomes like food,
money, or social praise. In parallel, recent neuroethological studies of decision making have focused on nat-
ural behaviors like foraging, mate choice, and social interactions. These decisions strongly impact evolu-
tionary fitness and thus are likely to have played a key role in shaping the neural circuits that mediate decision
making. This approach has revealed a suite of computational motifs that appear to be shared across a wide
variety of organisms. We argue that the existence of deep homologies in the neural circuits mediating choice
may have profound implications for understanding human decision making in health and disease.Introduction
Some decisions in life are complex and momentous, like whom
to marry or whether to change careers. These choices are
informed by a lifetime of accumulated experience and social
knowledge and are made based on predictions about what life
will be like in the future. Smaller decisions—how fast to drive,
whether to binge-watch the entire season of Arrested Develop-
ment, whom to talk to—are less deliberative and require lower
cognitive effort. Yet decisions, both large and small, can be
viewed as outcomes of the processes by which the brain trans-
lates sensation into action. More broadly, the language of deci-
sions connotes behavior, including the aberrant behaviors that
attend psychiatric disorders. For instance, drugs of abuse, which
act at the molecular level, nonetheless alter brain function at a
circuit level as well, bending motivation toward drugs them-
selves and away from more adaptive activities. But how do
such changes in the brain manifest themselves as changes in
behavior? To understand this question, we must understand
how the brain decides.
Of course, the concept of decision is not unambiguous. One
might argue that any motor response to sensory input is a deci-
sion, although this would include reflex processes that do not
intuitively merit the term (Glimcher, 2004). Alternatively, wemight
require that decisions be conscious and deliberative, but this,
too, excludes many interesting classes of phenomena such as
implicit bias and rapid physical responses as in sports. The
question also arises as to whether decisions must always occur
over multiple options, or whether withholding an action also
qualifies as a decision (Gold and Shadlen, 2007). If, as has
been suggested (Shadlen et al., 2008), a decision is a commit-
ment to a particular proposition, including actions as well as
ideas, there remains the question of what this ‘‘commitment’’
means neurobiologically. Should rapid sequences of motor
actions, despite being unconscious, be considered decisions if
they can be interrupted or varied? Can all decisions be viewed
in a cost-benefit framework, and if so, does this paradigm hold950 Neuron 82, June 4, 2014 ª2014 Elsevier Inc.biologically, or simply in an ‘‘as if’’ sense? Clearly, the semantics
of what, exactly, constitutes a decision have proven philosophi-
cally and practically challenging (Glimcher, 2004). In what fol-
lows, we will hew to the idea that decisions commit the organism
to one out of several possible behaviors (including thoughts) and
that these commitments are flexible and modifiable rather than
rigid and ineluctable.
Although most nonhuman animals do not appear to agonize
over life’s decisions (lucky them), some of their behaviors can
be described as decision making and, moreover, these deci-
sions can be measured. For instance, in many primate social
groups, males do not mate with all females, because to do so
would risk reprisals from dominant males. Yet the presence of
a sexually receptive female is among the most potent natural
stimuli in the animal’s sensory world. That the mapping between
sensation and behavior is flexible enough to take into account
such complex and fluid information as the present state of a
group’s dominance hierarchy argues against a simple view of
stimulus-response mappings and for a richer, more nuanced
view phrased in terms of decisions. Even for behaviors of lesser
complexity, animals must feed, and in doing so, often navigate
their environment in ways that necessitate choosing paths,
selecting food items, and switching between exploration and
exploitation of food sources. Again, animals pursue these behav-
iors flexibly, in a way not easily explained as simple reflexes.
Later, we will argue that behaviors of this type—behaviors
animals have evolved to perform most efficiently and effec-
tively—offer distinct advantages to the study of decisionmaking.
For now, however, we simply note that these behaviors, and their
laboratory analogs, arguably merit the term ‘‘decision,’’ if for no
other reason than they depend on context and adapt flexibly in
ways difficult to reconcile with simple stimulus-response map-
pings.
So when we refer to ‘‘decision neuroscience’’ in this Review,
we refer to the processes bywhich sensory stimuli, some tempo-
rally remote, interact with cognitive, motivational, mnemonic,
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Physiologically, the study of decision processes focuses on
the neural processing stream between its inputs and outputs,
including limbic, mnemonic, and associational circuits that inter-
pose between sensory and motor systems. It is the essential
processing in the middle of the input/output stream that makes
organisms more complicated than reflex machines. Here we
review some recent directions in the literature on decision mak-
ing, paying special attention to the frameworks in which the
neurobiology of choice has been studied, and point out what
we believe are fruitful recent directions in the literature, in partic-
ular from the vantage of ethology and evolutionary ecology.
A Neuroscience of Choice: The Advent of
Neuroeconomics
In recent years, neuroeconomics has made substantial contri-
butions to our understanding of decision making through the
application of quantitative tools and frameworks derived from
economics and psychology to neuroscience (Camerer et al.,
2005; Glimcher, 2002, 2003, 2004; Glimcher and Rustichini,
2004; Platt and Huettel, 2008; Sugrue et al., 2005). Concepts
such as utility and subjective value, delay discounting, risk,
and ambiguity have been shown to have correlates in the ner-
vous systems of both humans and nonhuman animals, and
frameworks including reinforcement learning have provided
new conceptual models for analyzing relationships between
neural codes and behavior. The rapid expansion of neuroeco-
nomics in the last decade has drawn together disparate strands
of research on reward, motivation, and learning under a single
banner. Several of the key early discoveries emphasized value-
based decisions and culminated in the economic utility synthesis
that organizes much contemporary work in this field.
The first major discovery emerged from studies on the repre-
sentation of reward in the brain. In what would become a founda-
tional work for both computational and decision neuroscience,
Schultz, Montague, and Dayan (Schultz et al., 1997) published
a synthesis of several studies demonstrating that the firing of
dopamine neurons in the primate midbrain signals reward pre-
diction errors as predicted by theories of reinforcement learning,
hinting that the brain’s internal motivational processes might
yield to quantitative analysis. Around the same time, Knutson
and collaborators showed the first signs of robust hemodynamic
activation of ventral striatum in human subjects incentivized with
money (Knutson et al., 2001), a nonprimary reward with no
intrinsic survival value, suggesting that the brain might use
similar codes to evaluate both primary and secondary reward.
In another early study, Platt and Glimcher recorded neuronal
activity from the lateral intraparietal area (LIP), a cortical area
involved in connecting visual stimulation to attention and orient-
ing movements of the eyes, in monkeys choosing between two
targets associated with fluid reward (Platt and Glimcher, 1999).
This was a novel departure from previous studies, in which
animals had been trained to produce specific, experimenter-
determined behaviors in response to physical cues. In this
experiment, the two options differed in size or probability of
reward across blocks of trials. Platt and Glimcher found that
the firing rates of LIP neurons encoded the product of reward
size and reward probability, equal to the mean, or ‘‘expectedvalue,’’ of each option, a variable first theorized to underlie deci-
sion making over 300 years ago. Consistent with this notion,
firing rates predicted monkeys’ choices. While not the first
evidence that the brain combined reward magnitude and proba-
bility, this work drew attention to a growing body of literature
endorsing utility theory as a useful tool for unveiling the pro-
cesses by which the brain organizes action (Edmonds and Gal-
listel, 1974; Shizgal, 1997).
These findings resonated with separate programs of research
that had investigated decision making in prefrontal cortex,
particularly the ventromedial/orbitofrontal region (OFC; see
below). A rich series of studies in prefrontal patients demon-
strated that orbitofrontal lesions produce deficits in decision
making, particularly when making choices between probabilistic
gambles (Bechara et al., 1999, 2000a). These findings accorded
with even earlier work in nonhuman primates demonstrating the
responsivity of single neurons in OFC to associative learning of
olfactory cues, appetitive tastants such as fats, and taste-
specific satiety (Critchley and Rolls, 1996; O’Doherty et al.,
2001; Rolls et al., 1996, 1999). These results were expanded
by studies demonstrating the responsiveness of OFC neurons
to relative changes in amounts of fluid reward, as well as to rela-
tive preference among reward (Schultz et al., 2000; Tremblay
and Schultz, 1999, 2000). Thus evidence from both single
neurons and human imaging coalesced around the idea that
the orbitofrontal cortex encoded subjective value of reward
and suggested it might serve as a potential hub of decision mak-
ing in the brain (Bechara and Damasio, 2005; Bechara et al.,
2000b; O’Doherty et al., 2001; Rolls, 2000).
In parallel with these developments, studies of social deci-
sions in the field of behavioral economics began to be viewed
increasingly in biological terms. For example Fehr and col-
leagues (Fehr and Fischbacher, 2003; Fehr and Ga¨chter, 2002)
found that in a monetary investment game in which participants
were required to trust others to return the proceeds from their
investment, third party individuals punished cheaters at their
own expense, promoting future cooperation. This behavior,
they suggested, may have enabled the evolution of cooperative
human behavior. Such a perspective accorded well with func-
tional imaging (e.g., McCabe et al., 2001; reviewed in Fehr and
Camerer, 2007) and noninvasive pharmacological manipulations
(Kosfeld et al., 2005), which showed that prefrontal regions were
more active for play against a human than computer opponent
and that administration of the neuropeptide oxytocin increased
trust behavior in participants. This line of research thus began
a symbiosis that became a hallmark of decision neuroscience:
economics provided the means for a more rigorous investigation
of social behavior, while the inclusion of biological factors broad-
ened and deepened our understanding of the context in which
decisions took place.
These early studies quickly gave rise to, and coalesced
around, a set of ideas linking the neurobiological study of deci-
sions with the quantitative tools and framework of economics.
In tandem with the growth of functional MRI as a tool in cognitive
neuroscience, investigators moved to identify the neural pro-
cesses underlying economic variables like probability, risk, am-
biguity, and utility (Hayden et al., 2010; Hsu et al., 2005; Huettel
et al., 2006; Kable and Glimcher, 2007; Knutson and Peterson,Neuron 82, June 4, 2014 ª2014 Elsevier Inc. 951
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vided an early synthesis of these ideas, in which he argued
that, in order to make decisions between disparate types of
goods—food and money, for example—the brain must rely on
a final common pathway for comparing their value. Glimcher
specifically argued that this neural amalgam might well corre-
spond to the economic concept of subjective utility, whose
axiomatic foundations were laid decades earlier by Von
Neumann, Morganstern, and Savage (Von Neumann and Mor-
genstern, 1947; Savage, 2012). That is, choice options should
be represented in the brain as directly comparable utilities, a
‘‘common currency’’ in which costs and benefits could be
weighed together for the purpose of selection appropriate ac-
tions (reviewed in Levy and Glimcher, 2012). This idea sketched
an explicit roadmap for neuroeconomics: namely, to identify the
brain structures contributing to utility computation and compar-
ison and determine their roles in the process.
The brain structures currently thought to underlie decision
making emerged as candidates in the earliest studies and have
garnered sustained interest since. They include the orbitofrontal
and cingulate cortices, anterior insular cortex, posterior parietal
cortex, the amygdala, and ventral striatum. Not only are many of
these areas linked by the same ‘‘limbic’’ aspects of the cortico-
basal ganglia loop, they share connections (often reciprocal)
with dopaminergic and serotonergic nuclei in the midbrain
(Haber and Knutson, 2010). Most importantly, these areas are
routinely and reliably activated in human subjects anticipating
or choosing between options resulting in monetary reward, as
well as nutritive outcomes, altruistic donations to others, and
pictures of attractive faces (Smith et al., 2010; Tankersley
et al., 2007). These observations, in combination with studies
showing neural correlates of reward (Tremblay and Schultz,
1999), risk, evidence accumulation (Gold and Shadlen, 2007),
and effort costs in monkeys and rodents (Rudebeck et al.,
2006; Walton et al., 2003, 2006), provided strong evidence for
a distributed system of utility computation and comparison.
Likewise, subsequent developments have strengthened the
influence of computational learning models, particularly rein-
forcement learning, as frameworks for analyzing choice behavior
and understanding the biology of decision making. Following on
the work of Schultz, Montague, and Dayan, investigators looked
for and identified correlates of subjective utility (Kable and
Glimcher, 2007; Peters and Bu¨chel, 2009), temporal discounting
of future reward (Kable and Glimcher, 2007; Kim et al., 2008;
Louie and Glimcher, 2010; McClure et al., 2004, 2007), action
values (Barraclough et al., 2004; Behrens et al., 2007; Kennerley
et al., 2006; Quilodran et al., 2008), online updating of value in the
face of environmental change (Barraclough et al., 2004; Behrens
et al., 2007; Daw et al., 2006; Dorris andGlimcher, 2004; Pearson
et al., 2009; Sugrue et al., 2004), and decision confidence
(Kepecs et al., 2008; Kiani and Shadlen, 2009; Resulaj et al.,
2009). These studies further strengthened the hypothesis, long
argued by behavioral scientists, that animals, including humans,
acquire complex behavioral patterns using algorithms similar to
those used in robotics to guide artificial agents. The neuroeco-
nomic findings, however, began to proffer a specific neural
code that is actually used by the brain to implement the pro-
posed learning algorithms.952 Neuron 82, June 4, 2014 ª2014 Elsevier Inc.OFC Encodes Heterogeneous Information
The first generation of neuroeconomic studies found evidence
for utility-related activity in brain regions such as orbitofrontal
and cingulate cortices, striatum, and posterior parietal cortex,
as well as the dopaminergic and serotonergic systems. These
findings gave rise to the hypothesis that a distributed network
of brain regions was responsible for computing the utility of
choice options, with particular functions assigned to particular
choice options. However, recent findings have brought new
complications to bear on this early consensus, which rested
largely, but not entirely, on evidence from human neuroimaging.
In particular, single-unit studies from a variety of research groups
have noted a heterogeneity in the patterns of neuronal responses
to variables like reward (Abe and Lee, 2011; Hayden and Platt,
2010), effort (Rudebeck et al., 2006), and cost (Kennerley et al.,
2009) that was not apparent in seminal early studies. That is, in-
dividual neurons appear to be responsive to nearly all combina-
tions of task-related variables, with only quantitative differences
between regions (Wallis and Kennerley, 2010).
But why should heterogeneity be a problem? At issue is the
meaning of statements like ‘‘ACC encodes action values’’ or
‘‘OFC encodes utility,’’ and whether these statements are
comparable to more accepted ones like ‘‘area MT encodes
visual motion’’ or ‘‘the fusiform gyrus encodes faces.’’ In the
latter cases, what we implicitly mean is that a large fraction of
the cells in a given area respond reliably to a given class of in-
puts, typically with a well-characterized response pattern (tuning
curve, burst firing, etc.) (Parker and Newsome, 1998). In other
words, we expect that the ‘‘average’’ unit in an area is strongly
driven by a given variable and that most units are similar to the
prototype.
How closely do neurophysiological results align with this
picture? In the simplest version of the common currency hypoth-
esis, cells in ‘‘utility’’ regions should compute the building blocks
of utility, and firing rates should reflect either utility or its constit-
uent components. In alternative theories (Beck et al., 2008;
Cisek, 2012; Ma et al., 2006), a population of preferentially tuned
cells encodes utility at a population level, obviating the need for a
monotonic representation of utility by individual neurons. Yet, the
measured responses of individual cells in many of these regions
are often farmore complex than the simple ‘‘region X encodes Y’’
pattern.
Consider, for instance, the case of the orbitofrontal cortex
(OFC). Neuronal activity in the OFC has been shown to be sensi-
tive to properties of a reward, including its size, probability, and
delay (Kennerley and Wallis, 2009; O’Neill and Schultz, 2010;
Roesch et al., 2006; Wallis and Miller, 2003). In simple tasks
involving nutritive reward, OFC neurons respond similarly to all
cues that lead to the same outcome, even if the stimulus proper-
ties of those cues are different (Schoenbaum et al., 2011). More-
over, neurons in primate OFC encode utility for different flavors
of fluid reward on a common scale (but see below) (Padoa-
Schioppa and Assad, 2006). Combined with corroborative
fMRI evidence (Peters and Bu¨chel, 2010), these findings endorse
the idea that OFC is a primary site of common currency com-
putation. That is, OFC is the node at which abstract notions of
utility are assigned to disparate types of reinforcement. These
findings constituted one of the great early breakthroughs of
Figure 1. The Terms ‘‘vmPFC’’ and ‘‘OFC’’
Are Used Inconsistently within and across
Subfields of Neuroscience
(A) Anatomically delineated regions of OFC have
high correspondence between humans (left) and
macaques (right). Reproduced with permission
from Mackey and Petrides (2010). Based on
nonhuman primate neuroanatomy, OFC proper
corresponds to all colored brain areas, except 10,
24, 25, and 32.
(B) Nearly identical brain coordinates are
described both as vmPFC, left (data from Levy and
Glimcher, 2012; coordinates illustrated using
Neurosynth) and OFC (from Cox et al., 2005).
(C) vmPFC is a descriptive term and is used in the
neuroeconomics literature to refer to regions in the
OFC, ACC, and the nearby medial wall (repro-
duced fromHare et al., 2009), illustrating data from
previous studies (dark blue [Kable and Glimcher,
2007], light blue [Rolls et al., 2008], red [Plassmann
et al., 2007], and green [Hare et al., 2008]).
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cepts drawn from economics to assign a specific functional
role to a poorly understood brain region (Montague and Berns,
2002). Yet in the studies where utility signals were found in
OFC, these signals, corresponding to the offered and chosen
values of options, were found in only a small (but highly signifi-
cant) percentage of neurons (Padoa-Schioppa and Assad,
2006, 2008), while in tasks examining a different set of deci-
sion-related variables (Kennerley and Wallis, 2009; Wallis and
Kennerley, 2010), half the neurons in this area were responsive
to some variable (reward, probability of reward, effort cost).
Clearly, signals in OFC carry information about decision vari-
ables, but this information appears to be encoded much more
heterogeneously and diffusely than in better-characterized sen-
sory or motor areas.
OFC versus vmPFC: Distinction with a Difference?
To complicate things further, those subregions of OFC in which
neurons reliably encode utility in monkeys do not correspond to
those regions that show hemodynamic activation during similar
tasks in humans. The vast imaging literature on decision neuro-
science leaves little doubt that both vmPFC and OFC both play
some role in processing reward. Yet confusion persists about
the respective definitions and roles of these regions.
The term ‘‘ventromedial prefrontal cortex’’ is a general
description of a region of the brain and does not correspond to
any cytoarchitectural boundaries. It is not a term used historically
in the anatomical literature and gained popularity with the advent
of functional imaging. Because cytocarchitectonic boundaries
can only be defined in postmortem brains, the use of the term
‘‘vmPFC’’ in the imaging literature is descriptive: a shorter way
of saying, ‘‘somewhere near the bottom of the brain, in the front,
in the middle.’’ Use of the term vmPFC typically corresponds to
regions within anterior cingulate cortex or just anterior to it
(though sometimes ACC and vmPFC are reported as separate
regions), including Brodmann’s areas 32, 24, and 14.
In contrast, the term ‘‘orbitofrontal cortex’’ is commonly used
in the anatomical literature and has been formally described as
being equivalent to Brodmann’s areas 10, 11, 12/47, 13, and14 (Carmichael and Price, 1994; Petrides and Pandya, 1994).
BA 11, 13, and 14 are the portions of OFC most often implicated
in studies of value and utility, with 11 lying anterior to 13, and 14
lying medial to 13 (see Figure 1A). Area 14 is the most ventral
section of the medial wall and therefore can ostensibly fall under
the heading vmPFC as well as OFC. In fact, connectivity studies
imply that area 14 serves as a bridge between BA 13 in OFC,
which has extensive sensory input but little motor output, and
BA 24 and 32 in cingulate, which has motor output but not sen-
sory input. BA 10 is commonly (though not always) considered
synonymous with ‘‘the frontal pole’’ and is thought to have a
less prominent role in reward processing; and area 12/47 refers
to lateral OFC and is often associated with punishment, rather
than reward. The anatomical maps of OFC are highly similar be-
tween humans and nonhuman primates (Figure 1A; Murray et al.,
2007; Petrides and Pandya, 1994; Wallis, 2007).
Since fMRI-based studies do not provide access to the
anatomical markers that differentiate these various subregions
of cortex, inconsistencies in brain region nomenclature were
inevitable. Consequently, the relationship between frontal cortex
and reward processing can be confusing. For example, activity
ascribed to vmPFC in one paper will be ascribed as OFC in
another, and vice versa, despite similar coordinates (e.g., (0,
44, 12) in [Levy and Glimcher, 2012]; (4, 37, 7) in [Cox
et al., 2005]; see Figure 1B). Moreover, the location of the
vmPFC held to encode common currency in many fMRI studies
finds its home on the orbital floor in the work of one prominent
group (Hare et al., 2008; Plassmann et al., 2007) and more
dorsally, in ACC, in another highly influential paper (Kable and
Glimcher, 2007) (see Figure 1C). Recent advances like the brain
mapping meta-analysis tool Neurosynth (http://neurosynth.org/)
(T. Yarkoni et al., 2011, INCF, conference; Yarkoni et al., 2011)
have begun the process of disambiguation, but much confusion
persists as to the specific roles of these various subregions of
cortex and how they contribute to decision making and utility
calculation. Moreover, identification of functional differences in
neural networks within any single brain region is not yet possible
using fMRI: voxels in the typical fMRI study are about 2 mm2, a
smoothing kernel of approximately 5–6 mm is applied duringNeuron 82, June 4, 2014 ª2014 Elsevier Inc. 953
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clusters containing ten contiguous voxels or greater are typically
considered during the analysis. This level of spatial resolution
precludes the differentiation of neuronal populations that are
functionally distinct but intercalated into a single, functionally
heterogeneous brain region.
Consideration of single-unit electrophysiology complements
the functional imaging body of knowledge but adds another level
of complexity as well. Most notably, whereas ‘‘common cur-
rency’’ signals in vmPFC are common in the imaging literature,
single neurons in the same regions in monkey do not encode
this feature (Wallis, 2012). Instead, the canonical finding of single
neuron common currency representation was described in Area
13 m, a part of lateral OFC (Padoa-Schioppa and Assad, 2006).
This finding is inconsistent with the bulk of the functional imaging
reports of reward-related OFC activation. In contrast, lesion
studies in nonhuman primates implicate medial OFC in value
comparison and lateral OFC in flexibly updating stimulus-reward
associations linking environmental stimuli to outcomes (Noonan
et al., 2010, 2012; Rudebeck and Murray, 2011; Walton et al.,
2011). Yet other studies find only limited evidence of common
currency encoding in neurons in either medial or lateral OFC,
at least in the context of a social reward task (Watson and Platt,
2012). These differences across studies imply OFC is sensitive to
the context in which the reward is received.
Single-unit studies of reward in prefrontal cortex make clear
that neuronal populations are functionally heterogeneous, that
single neurons are multiplexed into different functional roles,
and that reward processing occurs in a distributed fashion
across many regions of cortex (Abe and Lee, 2011; Sul et al.,
2010; Takahashi et al., 2013; Wallis and Kennerley, 2010). In
this light, it is likely that vmPFC and OFC will continue to evade
a single, modular, functional role assignment. The challenge
will be to identify neural circuits and computational structures
that span frontal cortex, or indeed the entire brain, that enable
animals to perform sophisticated reward-based behaviors.
Common Currency Gets Complicated
In addition to the heterogeneity of population encoding in OFC in
decision-making tasks (see above), other evidence also seems
to dispute the notion that the primary function of OFC is to
compute utility in a common currency. Studies in rats and
monkeys demonstrate that features of the predictors, outcomes,
or responses required to receive a reward are also encoded by
neurons in OFC (Schoenbaum et al., 2011). At the very least,
many OFC neurons signal variables other than reward or punish-
ment and are additionally sensitive to specific features present in
the environment. For instance, a recent paper comparing the
responses of OFC neurons to two different modalities of reward
found little evidence in support of a common currency neural
code for utility (Watson and Platt, 2012). In that study, monkeys
performed a decision-making task in which they chose between
two targets offering disparate amounts of fluid reward, one of
which was paired with images of other monkeys. In this task,
choices are strongly determined by the size of fluid reward asso-
ciated with each target, yet monkeys sometimes choose to see
some images, particularly the faces of dominant males or the
perinea of females (Deaner et al., 2005), even when doing so954 Neuron 82, June 4, 2014 ª2014 Elsevier Inc.yields slightly less fluid than choosing not to see the images.
This substitutability of fluid reward and visual images is a key
component of utility in economics. Although choices were
largely determined by fluid value, neuronal activity in OFC was
much more strongly determined by which images were on offer.
More OFC neurons discriminated between social image cate-
gories (e.g., images of dominant monkey faces versus subordi-
natemonkey faces) than between fluid amounts (largest possible
fluid amount versus smallest possible fluid amount). This
discrepancy between choice behavior and neuronal sensitivity
belies any simple, direct correspondence between utility as in-
ferred from revealed preferences and a common neural currency
of utility in OFC.
In fact, in this task, decision context was a major determinant
of neuronal activity in OFC. Specifically, the type of image avail-
able for viewing (dominant male, female, etc.) in each block of
20–30 trials was correlated with firing rates of OFC neurons,
regardless of which decision the monkey made. When monkeys
chose to view a blank screen, the type of image monkeys chose
not to see influenced neuronal activity. Consistent with these
findings, Padoa-Schioppa reported that the activity of OFC
neurons is not always a good predictor of behavioral preferences
(Padoa-Schioppa, 2013). When monkeys were roughly indif-
ferent to two different juice flavors offered in different amounts,
and hence the utility of the two offers was by definition equiva-
lent, firing rates of OFC neurons did not predict decisions.
Instead, trial-to-trial fluctuations in the activity of neurons encod-
ing the flavor of the chosen juice-predicted choices.
Finally, lesion studies in both humans and animals suggest
that the OFC’s role in decision making extends beyond the
computation and representation of utility on a common neural
scale. Although humans with OFC lesions do exhibit profound
abnormalities in decision making (e.g., Fellows and Farah,
2003, 2007), these deficits tend to be subtle, impervious even
to diagnosis through neuropsychological testing in a standard
clinical setting (Eslinger and Damasio, 1985). By contrast, OFC
lesions strongly disrupt performance in tasks in which the
association between cue and outcome is unstable across trials
(Schoenbaum et al., 2011). OFC lesions reliably interfere with
reversal learning, in which stimulus-reward associations are
abruptly reversed (Schoenbaum et al., 2011). These findings
have been replicated in monkeys (Murray and Wise, 2010),
revealing that OFC lesions interfere not with the computation
of utility but in the flexible linkage of cues and outcomes. This
suggests that OFC guides decision making by allowing the ani-
mal to learn and predict relationships between environmental
cues and important outcomes (including reward), particularly
in situations in which the relationship between cues and out-
comes is subject to change (Murray and Wise, 2010). The
need to rapidly update stimulus-outcome associations is partic-
ularly profound in social contexts, in which changes in mood or
goals in a single individual, or changes in behavioral interactions
between several, can happen in an instant. The transition be-
tween relaxed tolerance and intense aggression within a social
group often occurs nearly instantaneously, and far more rapidly
than the depletion of food patches. This demand for rapid up-
dating of appropriate responses in social contexts may have
been a primary evolutionary driver of the enlargement and
Neuron
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But this complexity is far from limited to OFC. In many of the
midline and lateral cortical areas thought to be important to the
process of decision making, neuronal responses have proven
highly heterogeneous, with variability in tuning curve shape
and direction (increasing or decreasing), which combinations
of variables are encoded, and conclusions about which partic-
ular computations should be assigned to a given area (Abe and
Lee, 2011; Hayden and Platt, 2010; Heilbronner et al., 2011; Ken-
nerley andWallis, 2009; Pearson et al., 2009; Seo and Lee, 2007;
Wallis and Kennerley, 2010). Moreover, studies that have sought
to test the prediction of the common currency hypothesis that
utility will be encoded consistently across disparate reward, con-
texts, and types of decisions within the same experimental ses-
sion have met with mixed results (Dorris and Glimcher, 2004;
Heilbronner et al., 2011; Kennerley and Wallis, 2009; Luk and
Wallis, 2009; Padoa-Schioppa and Assad, 2006). Even within a
task, prefrontal regions appear to encode different task-related
variables at different times during a single trial. For example, neu-
rons in lateral prefrontal cortex (LPFC), which lies anatomically
downstream of OFC, are sensitive to value when the monkey
has knowledge of the amounts and types of juices available
but no knowledge of the action required to report his choice
(Cai and Padoa-Schioppa, 2012). Once the information about
the necessary action is revealed, the LPFC neurons switch
from encoding value to encoding the action plan.
While not ruling out the common currency hypothesis, these
findings suggest that simple intuitions about how the nervous
system computes decisions—those based on monotonic
encoding of utility—do not fully align with evidence at the single
neuron level. When neurons respond inconsistently and hetero-
geneously to multiple experimental variables, it is an indication
both that we have yet to hit on the correct ‘‘neural axes’’—the
preferred variables encoded by the brain—and that the actual
computations involved are significantly more complex than sim-
ple models assume or that they are distributed among neural
populations in a fashion more sophisticated than instantiated
in current models.
Not Just Prediction Error: The Complications of
Dopamine
Yet the common currency hypothesis is not the only neuroeco-
nomic theory to have been substantially complicated by recent
findings. Even the early computational breakthroughs linking
dopamine to reinforcement learning have required reevaluation
as evidence has mounted for a broader role for dopamine in
motivated behavior. Equally influential theories of dopamine
function posit that dopamine is responsible for encoding motiva-
tional value more broadly as opposed to hedonic value—
‘‘wanting’’ instead of ‘‘liking’’—and that dopamine’s primary
role is in signaling ‘‘incentive salience’’ (Berridge, 2007; Tindell
et al., 2009). In many cases, this definition overlaps with that of
the reward prediction error hypothesis, but there remain concep-
tually interesting boundary cases in which events are salient
without prediction error and vice versa (Bromberg-Martin et al.,
2010; Horvitz, 2000; Lammel et al., 2014). Indeed, more recent
physiological studies have both elucidated connections be-tween the dopaminergic midbrain and other brainstem nuclei
and demonstrated that responses of dopamine cells are more
diverse than the classic prediction error response (Bromberg-
Martin and Hikosaka, 2009; Bromberg-Martin et al., 2010;
Fiorillo, 2013; Matsumoto and Hikosaka, 2009; Matsumoto and
Takada, 2013). These studies have shown that signaling by the
dopaminergic midbrain is both anatomically precise and more
diverse than at first suspected. For instance, cells within VTA
that stain positive for tyrosine hydroxylase and project to the
lateral habenula (LHB), a nucleus that responds to aversive
events and indirectly inhibits VTA, nonetheless inhibit the LHB
via release of GABA (Jhou et al., 2009; Stamatakis and Stuber,
2012; Stamatakis et al., 2013). While not upending the reward
prediction error hypothesis, this suggests that the dopaminergic
midbrain transmits a repertoire of diverse, anatomically specific
signals rather than broadcasting a single prediction error.
With these new results pushing at the edges of the early
consensus, the limits of the first generation of neuroeconomic
models have become increasingly apparent. While many of the
foundational insights have continued to prove robust, there is
also a sense in which the earlier frameworks require a firmer
grounding in fundamental biology. Here we argue that, in addi-
tion to psychological and economic decision frameworks, our
understanding is likely to benefit from renewed focus on the
basic ecological problems that animals have actually evolved
to solve. To understand decisions within the brain, we must un-
derstand brains in their evolutionary and ecological context,
starting with the types of problems they have long confronted
and only later building toward the sophisticated quantitative
reasoning of enculturated humans. In what follows, we elaborate
upon this argument and review recent advances along these
lines.
Back to Nature: Decision Ethology
The brain is an organ that evolved to generate adaptive behavior
responsive to its environment. Just as ecological niches and
locomotor apparatus are diverse, so are nervous systems
diverse. And yet the vertebrate brain, the mammalian brain,
and the primate brain each represent both a refinement and an
elaboration of the same basic plan for an organ that maps
sensory inputs to motor outputs. Viewed this way, the brain
forms the core processor of the behavior machine, and the rele-
vant theoretical constructs for understanding its function are the
essential problems it confronts, the algorithms used to solve
them, and the underlying architecture that implements them.
This is bottom-up language, engineering language, and focuses
on constraints, hacks, and specializations for solving common
problems.
Decision science, by contrast, has been formulated as a uni-
versal approach to mathematizing behavior. It is axiomatic,
top-down, and general. It focuses on theorems, optimality, and
rationality. Among its strengths is a domain-agnostic set of tools
for parsing, discussing, and modeling choice behavior, and it is
the power of these tools that makes them attractive as roadmaps
to a neurobiology of decision making. Yet the flexibility and gen-
erality of the neuroeconomic approach also impose key limita-
tions for the applicability of these tools to biological systems.
This is partly because the neuroeconomic paradigm is designedNeuron 82, June 4, 2014 ª2014 Elsevier Inc. 955
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mony hides much crucial biological complexity. It is also
because, as computer scientists have long appreciated,
systems are more robust when they separate algorithms from
the details of their implementation. It is not because of a focus
on rationality and optimality, which serve as useful benchmarks.
Rather, it is because there remains little evidence to argue that
economic variables are the ‘‘right’’ neural variables, even if
they can be used to both prescribe and describe behavior in
an ‘‘as if’’ sense.
This last point merits special emphasis. As has often been
noted, human behavior displays striking departures from ratio-
nality (Ariely, 2009; Gigerenzer and Selten, 2002). Likewise, ani-
mal behavior can exhibit some of the same biases (Hayden et al.,
2010; Heilbronner and Hayden, 2013; Lakshminaryanan et al.,
2008; Pearson et al., 2010; Shafir, 1994; Stephens and Ander-
son, 2001). Yet these departures from rationality or optimality
just as often reflect our ignorance of constraints under which
agents operate, and modeling these constraints has been a
signal achievement of the mathematical approach to behavioral
ecology (i.e., foraging theory, mate selection theory), which we
endorse below. In both theories, optimality serves as a bench-
mark against which real behavior and models may be measured,
not a normative claim (or even a realistic hypothesis). Rather, the
promise of behavioral ecology when compared with other
models of decision making lies in the problems on which it
focuses. The problems of behavioral ecology and its offshoots
are problems of basic biology—the four ‘‘F’’s: fighting, foraging,
fleeing, reproduction—and the most likely to have undergone
significant selection pressure. As a result, they are the problems
most likely to have shaped the brain and dictated its function. By
contrast, the problemsmost basic to neuroeconomics—choices
between risky lotteries, intuitions about probabilities, purchasing
decisions—require borrowing from overlapping systems
adapted to different biological ends—termed ‘‘exaptation’’ in
the evolutionary biology literature (Gould and Vrba, 1982)—and
so may be more likely to constitute difficult ‘‘edge cases’’ for
the brain. Thus the ethological approach is not to be preferred
because it is less mathematical or suboptimal, but because its
central questions are likelier to map directly onto the problems
the brain evolved to solve.
In response to these considerations, several recent lines of
investigation have attempted to ground the study of decisions
more fully in its biological and evolutionary context. These
studies borrow from the language of mathematical behavioral
ecology—the mathematical study of animal behavior that
encompasses not only foraging, but diet selection, mate choice,
and collective dynamics (Giraldeau and Caraco, 2000; Stephens
and Krebs, 1986; Stephens et al., 2008)—and begin not with the
most complex decisions human beings can perform, such as
quantitative decisions about abstract concepts like money, but
with simple decisions common to a wide variety of animals:
should I chase this prey or not? Should I keep foraging where I
am, or look for something better? Should I leave the pack and
strike out on my own? Viewed mathematically, behavioral
ecology is a close cousin of both economics and evolution,
borrowing tools, including notions of optimality, from both. But
just as importantly, by furnishing uswith a set of tractablemodels956 Neuron 82, June 4, 2014 ª2014 Elsevier Inc.that often apply across species, it presents us with an opportu-
nity to study problems that recur across taxa, problems much
more likely to result in near-optimal behavior and utilize common
algorithms (Adams et al., 2012).
Two lines of thinking motivate this turn from a perspective
borrowed from neoclassical and behavioral economics to one
rooted in behavioral ecology and ethology. First is the argument
from function. Despite the fact that humans now routinely
engage in complex decisions like financial investments and inter-
action via social media, these activities have taken place only
very, very recently in evolutionary time. As a result, they recruit
circuits adapted for a variety of ancestral behaviors in new and
complex ways. Similarly, because most studies generalize
from complex tasks to underlying biology, tasks should be
closely aligned to basic biological strategies for their required
behaviors to map properly onto nervous system function. Sec-
ond is the argument from practicality. In animal behavior, true
cost functions are rarely known, and agents are assumed to
possess only limited computational capability. As a result, while
ethologists often borrow computational tools from economics
and decision theory, the emphasis is on discovering conditions
and constraints under which observed behaviors are normative.
Underlying this is the assumption that evolution works to punish
suboptimal behavior, but this assumption is more valid for
common tasks than for rare ones and for tasks more proximate
to reproductive success than those distal to it. Thus, common,
essential tasks offer greater potential for behaviors that are reli-
able, better characterized in an optimality framework, and have
much stronger ties to underlying neurophysiology.
Of course, most animal studies necessarily require a certain
level of ecological validity to facilitate ease of training, and all
laboratory paradigms are to some extent artificial. The key ques-
tion in the case of animals is whether the demands of the task
‘‘make sense’’ in the context of their natural environment.
Some foragers experience primarily sequential, not simulta-
neous, encounter with their foods; for these animals, two-alter-
native forced choice paradigms may not correspond as well to
the natural behavioral repertoire (Stephens and Krebs, 1986).
Similarly, an ability to make fine discriminations of probability
or to take into account enforced postreward delays may stretch
the cognitive capabilities of some animals (Blanchard et al.,
2013; Pearson et al., 2010; Stephens and Anderson, 2001; Ste-
phens andMcLinn, 2003). None of which is to say that such tasks
teach us nothing about the neurobiology of a given species.
Rather, the contrast is analogous to that in visual neuroscience
between presenting animals with artificial but mathematically
tractable stimuli like Gabor patches and ecologically rich but
mathematically difficult natural movies: the latter reveals pat-
terns of activity not always predicted by models developed
from former (Lewen et al., 2001; Vinje and Gallant, 2000).
In keeping with this approach, a number of recent papers have
begun to examine foraging-like decisions neurobiologically in a
host of model species (Bendesky et al., 2011; Flavell et al.,
2013; Hayden et al., 2011; Kolling et al., 2012; Kvitsiani et al.,
2013; Schwartz et al., 2012; Yang et al., 2008). This work has
strong ties to previous studies of decision making in volatile
environments (Barraclough et al., 2004; Behrens et al., 2007;
Daw et al., 2006; Pearson et al., 2009; Sugrue et al., 2004) but
Figure 2. Comparison of Foraging across Species
(A) Alternation between dwelling and roaming behaviors by C. elegans, under the control of serotonin and the neuropeptide pigment-dispersing factor (PDF)
(adapted from Flavell et al., 2013).
(B) Egg laying behavior by Drosophila varies between nutrient-rich and nutrient-poor areas in a manner displaying exquisite sensitivity to the costs and benefits
implicit moving from one patch of agar to the next (Yang et al., 2008).
(C–E) Neural activation in rodents (C), nonhuman primates (D), and humans (E), respectively, in versions of the patch-leaving paradigm (Hayden et al., 2011;
Kolling et al., 2012; Kvitsiani et al., 2013). In each case, heightened activity in the dorsal anterior cingulate cortex signals an imminent switch away from the current
default option. This suggests not only a remarkable degree of behavioral consistency across taxa, with similar decision algorithms across species, but a neural
consistency within mammals.
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drum in foraging—the patch-leaving problem—in which an ani-
mal must decide when to leave a depleting food patch and
search for another, richer one. In its original formulation (Char-
nov, 1976), patches were spatially separate, necessitating trade-
offs between diminishing returns and the time and energy costs
of travel to a new patch. In its modern laboratory incarnation,
patch leaving is simulated by delays or costs, though with the
same structure as its natural counterparts.
Two features of these studies are remarkable. First is the
ubiquity of near-optimal behavior across species. As has long
been appreciated (Stephens and Anderson, 2001; Stephens
and McLinn, 2003), decision tasks that are superficially very
similar can elicit vastly different behavior when framed as
foraging or economic temporal discounting problems, with the
former provoking near-optimal behavior (in accord with the so-
called ‘‘marginal value theorem’’) and the latter yielding system-
atically suboptimal behavior described by models of temporal
discounting. Second, neural activity in these studies seems
remarkably consistent, with activity in dorsal anterior cingulate
cortex apparently signaling a shift away from the current default
option in humans, primates, and rodents (Figure 2; Hayden et al.,
2011; Kolling et al., 2012; Kvitsiani et al., 2013;Wikenheiser et al.,
2013). Furthermore, the algorithms describing this behavior
appear to be shared across species, including worm and fruit
fly (Bendesky et al., 2011; Flavell et al., 2013; Schwartz et al.,
2012; Yang et al., 2008), albeit instantiated in different biological
‘‘hardware’’ (Adams et al., 2012).For instance, in a laboratory task in which monkeys made
foraging-like choices between an immediate reward option
with diminishing returns and a delayed option that reset the
reward option to its initial value, (analogous to the choice to
‘‘stay’’ in a current food patch or ‘‘leave’’ in search of new op-
tions) monkeys showed choice behavior very close to that pre-
dicted by the marginal value theorem: they continued to forage
in each ‘‘patch,’’ choosing the reward option, until the point at
which that reward fell below its mean value for the environment
as a whole, at which point monkeys chose to ‘‘leave’’ the patch
(Hayden et al., 2011). More importantly, firing of individual
neurons in anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) showed increasing
activity as the reward diminished and the animal neared its
‘‘leave’’ decision, reminiscent of the integration to bound mech-
anism observed in some brain areas during perceptual decision
making (Gold and Shadlen, 2007; Krajbich et al., 2010; Stanford
et al., 2010). And indeed, while the delay that followed the
‘‘leave’’ option modulated the rate of rise of the neural response,
firing rates at the time of the leave decision were consistent
across conditions, in keeping with the hypothesis of a neural
threshold for patch leaving. Yet neural responses in the foraging
decision showed key differences, as well: unlike the rapid rise in
firing rate observed in various premotor areas during visual mo-
tion discrimination, increases in ACC firing rates during foraging
took place over an entire series of decisions, on a timescale an
order of magnitude greater than those observed during a single
perceptual decision. In addition, ACC neurons did not fire contin-
uously for the duration of the task but in phasic bursts around theNeuron 82, June 4, 2014 ª2014 Elsevier Inc. 957
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foraging bout progressed. All this suggests that, if integration to
bound is indeed the relevant algorithm, it must be instantiated in
distinct neural circuits and is involved in separate computations,
an example of a computational algorithm replicated across
behaviors (Adams et al., 2012).
Recent results have both deepened and broadened these
findings. In a similar study in rodents (Kvitsiani et al., 2013),
distinct subtypes of prefrontal neurons preferentially influenced
stay and leave decisions. Specifically, perisomatically targeting
parvalbumin-positive neurons fired in response to leave deci-
sions and encoded the duration of the preceding patch
residence. In humans performing a similar foraging task, hemo-
dynamic activity in dACC signaled the decision to abandon a
current default option while the ventromedial prefrontal cortex
(vmPFC) was more involved with comparisons between options
(Kolling et al., 2012). Finally, a recent study of the related diet
selection task, in which monkeys were required to balance the
costs and benefits of different types of ‘‘prey’’ items (sequentially
offered delayed reward), found that dACC signaling depended
on choice: neurons encoded delay when animals chose the
reward but encoded reward amount when they rejected the offer
(Blanchard and Hayden, 2014). Together, these studies paint a
picture of ACC as a key node for making flexible decisions,
with activity primarily referenced to disengaging from the current
option. Nevertheless, what is truly striking is how consistent and
robust the findings are across species when probed with such
‘‘natural’’ foraging-like tasks.
Work on the neurobiology of foraging in invertebrates, while
confirming the behavioral predictions of the marginal value
theorem, has also presented a different and compelling picture
of the biological mechanisms that regulate search behavior in
these very different species. For instance, two recent papers
(Bendesky et al., 2011; Flavell et al., 2013) demonstrated that
different species of C. elegans differ in the time at which they
choose to leave a nutrient patch and that these differences are
regulated by polymorphisms in a noradrenaline-like catechol-
amine receptor. Moreover, a pair of neuromodulators, serotonin
and pigment-dispersing factor (PDF), govern the transition be-
tween foraging within a patch and searching for a new one. Along
similar lines, studies in fruit flies have shown that the process of
egg deposition involves a sensitive calibration of costs and ben-
efits, particularly nutrient density at the site of egg laying and
foraging costs of progeny (Schwartz et al., 2012; Yang et al.,
2008). In these cases, natural decisions faced by each species
appear to require the interplay of neural circuits that control the
action pattern with neuromodulators that shift these circuits
from one stable pattern to the other. This raises the possibility
that foraging decisions, as well as other large-scale behavioral
transitions, might likewise rely heavily on neuromodulator
signaling. If so, our understanding of decision-making disorders
linked to dysfunctional neuromodulatory systems might benefit
from consideration of these fundamental biological problems,
an important avenue for future research.
Despite these advances, it is important to emphasize that the
class of ethologically relevant prototype decisions is not limited
to foraging decisions or even decisions over nutritive reward.
In the next section, we turn to a much larger, richer class of de-958 Neuron 82, June 4, 2014 ª2014 Elsevier Inc.cisions—those involving the social milieu—to argue that these
behaviors constitute not only a much stronger challenge for the
value-based decision paradigm but a greater potential for
addressing larger questions in cognition.
No Ape Is an Island: The Promise of Social Cognition
For humans and most nonhuman primates, other individuals are
the most salient, dynamic, and important part of the natural envi-
ronment. For social animals, navigating group interactions pre-
sents one of the greatest sources of evolutionary pressure,
requiring capabilities as diverse as recognizing individuals,
knowing social rank, assessing mates, remembering past inter-
actions, competitive foraging, forming andmaintaining alliances,
predicting the behavior of others, and understanding third-party
relationships (Bergman et al., 2003; Cheney and Seyfarth, 2008;
Cheney et al., 1986). In fact, the increasing cognitive complexity
of group living in anthropoid primates may be responsible for the
enlargement of brain size across species (Dunbar, 1998; Dunbar
and Shultz, 2007).
From a methodological and operational standpoint, the diver-
sity of social stimuli and large repertoire of potential interactions
presents both a challenge and an opportunity. The challenge, of
course, is that tasks involving social behavior are incredibly diffi-
cult to control, with the separation between ‘‘low-level’’ stimulus
features and ‘‘higher’’ cognitive processes a particularly thorny
one. However, this dichotomy has also come to seem increas-
ingly subtle, with representations specific to social interactions
now thoroughly documented in both visual sensory (Tsao and
Livingstone, 2008; Tsao et al., 2003, 2006) and motor (Iacoboni
et al., 2005; Rizzolatti and Craighero, 2004) systems, as well as
in olfaction (Chamero et al., 2012). Thus, while social processes
may seem straightforward to define behaviorally—grooming,
aggression, courtship, mating, etc.—disentangling generalized
neural circuits from those specialized for social functions has
proven muchmore difficult, intimating that these behaviors differ
in degree more than kind. But the intrinsic complexity of social
interactions also presents an opportunity for decision neurosci-
ence. In a world of kinships, shifting dominance hierarchies,
and constant competition for life-or-death stakes, decision
systems must rely not only on complex, evolved priors for inter-
actions but on flexible behavioral updating in response to a
rapidly changing social landscape. That is, while nervous sys-
tems may not always possess specialized hardware for social
interaction, this interaction is important because it constitutes
most of what some species do with the hardware they have.
By contrast, most decision-making studies have relied on
nutritive rewards, which exist predominantly within a low-dimen-
sional space (one scale for each major nutrient). Though some
lines of research have studied multiple types of nutritive reward
(Padoa-Schioppa and Assad, 2006, 2008), examined the effects
of satiety (Balleine and Dickinson, 1998), or varied costs across
modalities like time andmuscular exertion (Wallis and Kennerley,
2010; Walton et al., 2006), the space of possible reward utilized
in most neurobiological studies to date has been quite limited.
And while such simplifications are often a useful feature
in designing well-controlled experiments, they also overlook
much of the complexity that social animals have evolved to
surmount, including the most critical decisions they face.
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cial stimuli should be comparable to other types of reward at the
level of utilities, and early behavioral and neural studies found
evidence for social value signals in the brain similar to those iden-
tified for fluid and monetary reward. Deaner and colleagues first
demonstrated that the value of social stimuli (images of
dominant and subordinate males and female hindquarters) for
monkeys could be measured behaviorally by the relative substi-
tutability of images and fluid reward in a simple choice task
(Deaner et al., 2005), and Hayden and colleagues extended the
same framework to measure the value of social stimuli for
humans by substitutability for monetary reward (Hayden et al.,
2007). Building on these behavioral studies, Smith and col-
leagues demonstrated that humans viewing pictures of attractive
faces activated regions of the vmPFC and OFC that were also
involved in processing monetary gains and losses (Smith et al.,
2010). Indeed, studies have identified the vmPFC as crucial for
encoding the utility of a wide array of reward types (Grabenhorst
and Rolls, 2011). Thus, these early studies bolstered the view
that social factors in the environment, like other variables, are
compressed by the brain into a single currency of utility that is
used when comparing options to render a decision.
Despite the attractive simplicity of this framework, subsequent
studies have demonstrated much additional complexity that is
not easily accounted for by the idea of a common neural
currency, a monotonic utilty scale within the brain. For example,
Heilbronner demonstrated that neurons in posterior cingulate
cortex signal value within a task but not across decision contexts
as diverse as risky choice, temporal discounting, and choice of a
social stimulus (Heilbronner et al., 2011). Even regions canoni-
cally associated in the fMRI literature with the representation of
utility, including OFC and striatum, have been shown in single-
unit neurophysiology studies to comprise segregated networks
or intercalated neurons that differentially respond to different
types of rewarding stimuli. For instance, when monkeys choose
between fluid reward and viewing social stimuli (Klein and Platt,
2013; Watson and Platt, 2012), single neurons in both striatum
and OFC responded much more strongly to the choice of social
information, even though fluid reward drove choice behavior
more strongly. Just as importantly, for those neurons signaling
social information, responses were not ordered by behavioral
preference but instead reflected attentional priority and social
context, suggesting a more complex representation of social
information than a simple common currency of utility. In the stria-
tum, populations of neurons signaling social information and
fluid reward exist along an anatomical gradient, with neurons in
themedial striatummore strongly signaling visual social informa-
tion and neurons in the lateral striatum, including the putamen,
more strongly signaling the value of fluid reward (Klein and Platt,
2013). We speculate that the parallel processing streams in the
primate striatum devoted to gustatory and social information,
respectively, arose from the partial repurposing of a primitive
neural network (Adams et al., 2012) (Figure 3A). This primitive
network was probably devoted to nutrient foraging, as variants
of such neural mechanisms are seen universally throughout
the animal kingdom. Duplication and specialization of such a
network for the purpose of social information foraging seems
likely to have emerged more recently in the primate lineage, inconcert with the evolution of large, complex, dynamic social
groups.
Similar to the striatum, OFC contains neurons that encode
social information as well as neurons that encode fluid reward
information (i.e., volume), but very few neurons respond to
both of these features in parallel. Social and nonsocial neurons
are not segregated anatomically, as they are in the striatum,
but are instead intercalated throughout the entire region. This
finding demonstrates how different experimental methods can
yield quite different pictures of brain function: fMRI studies
have repeatedly implicated ventromedial prefrontal cortex and
orbitofrontal cortex in reward processing and have identified
these regions as being indiscriminate with respect to rewardmo-
dality. Nonhuman primate and rodent electrophysiology studies,
however, demonstrate individual neurons in these areas are
specialized for specific types of reward information and that
these signals exist on a finer spatial scale than can be resolved
from BOLD signals.
A recent study investigating the role of OFC in the social trans-
mission of food preference (STFP) suggests that OFC may be
more important for ‘‘tagging’’ environmental features with their
current value in order to make appropriate decisions in the
future. In STFP, rats actively sniff the breath of other rats in order
to detect odors of previously eaten foods, and they use this infor-
mation to guide food choices in the future (Galef, 1977; Galef and
Giraldeau, 2001). This is a naturally occurring behavior that re-
quires no training, is learned in just a single social encounter,
and influences choices made weeks afterward. Such a powerful
behavioral effect lends itself to neuroscientific study and demon-
strates the utility of designing experiments that incorporate nat-
ural behaviors. Ross and colleagues (Ross et al., 2005) found
that this socially transmitted behavior is disrupted when acetyl-
choline is depleted in OFC. More recently, Lesburgueres et al.
(Lesburgue`res et al., 2011) found that blocking excitatory activity
in the OFC at the time of social learning did not alter the expres-
sion of food preferences 7 days later. Surprisingly, however, it
did cause the rats to forget their food preferences when tested
30 days later. Moreover, the OFC-dependent STFP required in-
creases in H3 histone acetylation, implying that an epigenetic
mechanism at the time of the social encounter predestined a
population of OFC neurons for long-term storage of odor-value
associations. This result is consistent with the view that,
although OFC neurons encode value during simple, well-learned
decisions (Padoa-Schioppa and Assad, 2006, 2008), in a rich,
real-world environments, they support learning (Schoenbaum
et al., 2009). According to this view, OFC enables animals to
track and predict dynamic features of the environment, and the
outcomes that follow, and thus supports the flexible updating
of behavior. It is unsurprising, then, that theseOFC circuits would
play an important role in social behavior. Although foraging envi-
ronments are somewhat labile over time—resource patches
become depleted, prey escape or arrive, and fruits ripen and
decay—social environments are even more dynamic and require
split-second modifications of behavior in order to keep up with
the fluctuating moods, movements, and interactions of others.
That the signaling of social information may involve richer rep-
resentation in motivational and limbic structures than initially
thought has been born out by subsequent studies, particularlyNeuron 82, June 4, 2014 ª2014 Elsevier Inc. 959
Figure 3. Putative Exaptation of Foraging-
Related Behaviors to Serve Social Function
in Primates
(A) Parallel channels for processing social and
nonsocial reinforcers in the primate striatum.
Neurons responsive to social reward are located
more medially, whereas neurons responsive to
fluid reward are more lateral. Normalized firing
profile of two example neurons in the striatum that
differentiate between a single type of reward. Left:
trials separated by image category; right: trials
separated by fluid amount. Decision task con-
sisted of a central fixation, a saccade toward a
decision target, delivery of juice reward, and an
optional image display. Time histograms are
aligned to proximate events. Insets illustrate loca-
tion of each recorded neuron. Reproduced from
Klein and Platt (2013).
(B) Facial muscle activity and BOLD activity
evoked by aversive gustatory or social outcomes.
Top left: activity of the levator labii muscle in the
face produces the wrinkled nose characteristic of
disgusted facial expression. Top middle: BOLD
activity elicited after viewing a disgusting ingestive
stimulus (video of an individual gagging and eating
raw condensed canned soup) overlaps with BOLD
activity correlated with tachygastria, fluctuations
of gut activity. This demonstrates the relationship
between the experienced emotion of disgust and
the state of the digestive system (Harrison et al.,
2010). Top right: BOLD activity associated with
receiving unfair offers in the Ultimatum game, a
proxy for social/moral disgust (Sanfey et al., 2003).
Bottom: similar patterns of facial activity are pro-
duced when tasting a bitter substance (bottom
left), viewing a disgusting picture (bottom middle),
or receiving an unfair offer in the Ultimatum game
(bottom right). Modified with permission from
Chapman et al. (2009). These findings suggest a
relationship between food avoidance and social
avoidance behaviors.
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orbitofrontal and anterior cingulate cortices inmonkeys perform-
ing a social reward allocation task, Chang and collaborators
(Chang et al., 2011) showed that even the encoding of reward
depended on social context. That is, neuronal responses to
received reward depended not only on the amount directly
received by the choosing monkey but on the amount received
by a partner. This finding was in line with previous studies that
had demonstrated that single neurons encode the amounts of
reward that monkeys might have obtained, had they chosen
differently (Abe and Lee, 2011; Hayden et al., 2009). These
findings echo the results of other studies in which monkeys
made choices in the presence of others (Azzi et al., 2012; Yosh-
ida et al., 2012), which showed that single cells in orbitofrontal
and dorsolateral prefrontal cortices, while individually carrying
information about both reward and social context, did not do
so in a monotonic or uniform manner. Thus, while these cells
multiplexed reward-relevant information, they did not appear
to reflect a combined utility encoding.
Of course, this is not to say that the brain at no point reduces
competing motor plans to a common currency appropriate for
action. Some direct comparison is almost certainly necessary960 Neuron 82, June 4, 2014 ª2014 Elsevier Inc.for action selection. However, these considerations raise the
question of how late in processing such a reduction in dimen-
sionality could take place and whether the early emphasis on
fluid reinforcement as a proxy for reward in general is as gener-
alizable as hoped. Similar trends have been apparent in recent
studies of social behavior, which have often focused on deter-
mining ‘‘social’’ areas of the brain. Yet evidence from neurophys-
iology (Chang et al., 2013; Klein and Platt, 2013; Klein et al.,
2008; Shepherd et al., 2009; Tsao and Livingstone, 2008) indi-
cates that social signals are present in the same subregions—
sometimes even encoded by the same neurons—as nonsocial
information, suggesting that social signals, at least in part, use
the same information infrastructure as nonsocial information.
In addition to the overlap between gustatory reward and
social reward described above, social and gustatory avoidance
behavior appears to share common neural circuitry. The emotion
of disgust is related to the avoidance of pathogens and toxins
and accompanies food rejection (Rozin and Fallon, 1987; Rozin
et al., 2009). In humans, disgust is commonly experienced
outside of food-related contexts, as moral or social disgust.
Disgusted facial expression accompanies bitter taste, disgusting
photographs, as well as feelings of social disgust evoked by
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evoked by viewing disgusting images overlaps with brain re-
presentations of digestive tract motility as measured by electro-
grastrogram (EGG) (Critchley and Rolls, 1996; Figure 3B). This
suggests that signals from the viscera may contribute to the
neural representation of disgust and implies a role for visceral
sensation in the experience of social disgust. Insula activity is
heightened by unfair offers during the Ultimatum Game (Sanfey
et al., 2003), Figure 3B), suggesting a role for this region in social
as well as nonsocial avoidance. Indeed activation in insular cor-
tex is commonly reported in fMRI studies of reward-based deci-
sion making, with a variety of interpretations (Craig, 2002; Liu
et al., 2011). Yet we believe, for reasons stated above, that the
latter effects in humans are likely to be better understood biolog-
ically in terms of the former.
Though separating unique contributions of neural circuits to
both social and nonsocial behavior has proven difficult (Carter
et al., 2012; Rushworth et al., 2013), comparative neurobiology
offers one way to gain traction on this question. For example,
studies comparing prairie and montane voles, which possess
similar morphological traits and behaviors but have different so-
cial and mating systems, have contributed tremendously to our
understanding of the biology of social behavior (Insel and Fer-
nald, 2004; McGraw and Young, 2010; Young and Wang,
2004). Prairie voles are known to maintain long-term pair bonds
in the wild: having copulated, pairs of voles remain in close prox-
imity, show affiliative behaviors such as huddling, and engage in
biparental care once the offspring are born. This contrasts
starkly with the behavior of montane voles, a closely related spe-
cies that exhibits no such pair bonding behavior. Anatomical
studies have shown that oxytocin and dopamine, and the local-
ization of their receptors in the nucleus accumbens and other
reward structures, play a crucial role in orchestrating partner
preferences in prairie voles (Young et al., 2001). A sizeable
body of work in humans has largely confirmed a role for oxytocin
in partner preference, as well as in prosocial decisions more
generally (Guastella and MacLeod, 2012). The example of the
prairie vole demonstrates how the selection of a species in which
the behavior of interest has undergone behavioral specialization
can help reveal the neurobiological substrate of that behavior.
Most importantly, the study of basic biological drives con-
tinues to illuminate the substrates from which more abstract
processes are likely to have evolved. Areas of insular cortex
responsible for detecting and reacting to physiological perturba-
tions lie along a gradient with more recently evolved areas
responsive to negative social emotions like moral outrage (Craig,
2002). Likewise, the amygdala’s ancestral role in predator detec-
tion and learning seems likely to have been extended to a
broader array of threats. In this view, it is not surprising to find
that posttraumatic stress disorder—the pathological extension
of vigilance to nonthreatening stimuli—is associated with amyg-
dala dysfunction (Morey et al., 2011). Thus, studies of low-level
functions in these areas point to basic processes like food eval-
uation and threat detection that underlie more recently adopted
functions. These observations strongly endorse comparative
studies in multiple divergent animal species to identify the com-
mon, fundamental mechanisms and unique specializations sup-
porting decision making.Conclusion
In the last 15 years, the neuroscientific study of decision making
has rapidly expanded from simple questions of reward and
learning to embrace topics in finance, ethics, and social psychol-
ogy. Yet as new tools and methods are brought to bear on these
questions, the difficulties and complexities of basic biology
seem increasingly at odds with simplified notions of a single, uni-
fied brain system that learns and makes decisions. While neuro-
economic analysis continues to provide a powerful normative
and descriptive framework for understanding the biology of
choice, it has largely ignored the insight that natural selection
has worked hardest and longest on a few key decision pro-
cesses and that complex behaviors are often cobbled together
atop older, simpler ones.
As a rejoinder, we have here proposed a complementary
framework that borrows insights from studies of ethology—
particularly foraging and social behavior—to suggest new con-
ceptual underpinnings for the study of the neural basis of deci-
sion making. This framework, too, employs optimality as a
benchmark, but it takes as its canonical processes biologically
fundamental tasks that many different organisms must solve
and thus are most likely to have shaped brain evolution. It is a
framework that embraces comparative ethology and privileges
the search for simple, robust algorithms capable of solving mul-
tiple types of biological problems (Adams et al., 2012). It is the
engineer’s and the ethologist’s approach to the brain, and we
believe it is the one most likely to uncover the basic building
blocks ofmore complex decisions, including thosemost relevant
to understanding neuropsychiatric disorders.REFERENCES
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